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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress drafted and passed the Endangered Species Act of 19731
(ESA) to "conserve to the extent practicable the various species of fish or
wildlife and plants facing extinction .... 2 I Congress articulated a purpose
statement that embodied the overall mission of the ESA:
The purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the
conservation of such endangered species and threatened species,
and to take steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of
the treaties and conventions set forth in ... this section.8
The primary goal of Congress in passing the ESA was "safeguarding...
the Nation's heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants"' through conservation.'
In addition to the protective benefits of the ESA to endangered or
threatened plants and animals, Congress passed the ESA "for the benefit
of all citizens" of the United States.'
Although the intent of Congress in passing the ESA was to benefit all
citizens, extensive litigation surrounding ESA enforcement regulations
indicates that not all citizens feel "benefitted." 7 Conflicts exist over
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
2. Id. § 1531(a)(4).
3. Id. § 1531(b). See also Fouke Co. v. Brown, 463 F. Supp. 1142 (E.D. Cal. 1979).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(5) (1988).
5. "The terms 'conserve', 'conserving', and 'conservation' mean to use and the use of all methods
and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point
at which the measures provided pursuant to this act are no longer necessary." Id. § 1532(3).
6. Id. § 1531(a)(5).
7. Three citizens of Wyoming, two of whom are ranchers, were recently fined by a U.S.
Magistrate $22,000, $30,000, and $5,000 for inadvertently poisoning bald and golden eagles.
Wyoming Ranchers Fined for Eagle Deaths, NATIONAL WOOL GROWER, Mar. 1993, at 35. The
deaths resulted from non-target eagles feeding on tainted carcasses designed to kill target predators
such as coyotes.
[T] hewolf promoters set about placinga $20,000 fine... for anyone convicted of killing
a wolf in Minnesota. With no trapping, and no one willing to risk arrest by shooting a wolf,
wolves in Minnesota have increased rapidly and are now running amok among Minnesota's
deer herds, and also forcing many a farmer to go out of business.
Lester J. McCann, Let's Not Allow Yellowstone Park to Become Another Killing Field, Guest
Editorial, MONTANA WOOLGROWER, Dec. 1992, at 8 (statewide sheep trade magazine).
My farming background, and having raised livestock all my life, brought vivid
memories of coyote attacks on my sheep in Illinois. Through my years of experience in the
magazine business I have seen many articles come to our office with pictures of wolf attacks
and coyote attacks on sheep as well as cattle.
It doesn't take a complete rocket scientist to figure out that there is no fence around ...
Yellowstone National Park. Plenty of large sheep flocks graze near the park and it is only a
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regulations protecting species and the critical habitat necessary to sustain
endangered or threatened species in the plant and animal kingdoms.8 This
Comment will first focus on the conflict between state-granted rights of
property owners to defend property from harm by wildlife and the
preemptive "taking" provision within the ESA. The common law defense
to taking game that cause property damage was set out in State v.
Rathbone,10 which the Montana Supreme Court decided long before
Congress passed the ESA. Christy v. Hodel" exemplifies the constitu-
tional tensions between federal interests and private property interests and
is relatively recent. The facts of Christy are set out followed by a discussion
of the conflicts between state constitutional rights and federal prohibitions
against exercising state constitutional rights to defend property from
wildlife.
Private hunting interests and agricultural interests have traditionally
backed legislation to enable state and federal agencies to allow hunting of
predators such as the timber wolf and the grizzly bear. This Comment will
next trace the history and analyze the reasoning of the court in Sierra Club
v. Clark12 in halting all hunting and trapping activities of the eastern
timber wolf in Minnesota absent proof of an "extraordinary case"'" where
the wolves have populated beyond the carrying capacity of the habitat.
This Comment will further trace the "extraordinary case" standard
through Christy v. Hodel where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals briefly
matter of time until the critters that are turned loose become what their name implies...
wolves.
Greg A. Deakin, Editorial, THE SUFFOLK BANNER, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 5 (nationwide sheep trade
magazine).
The above excerpts targeted farmers and ranchers through trade magazines. The ESA has enormous
potential to directly affect water use and land use on private land nationwide. See Melissa K. Estes, The
Effect of the Endangered Species Act on State Water Rights, 22 ENVTL. L. 1027 (1992); Rufus C.
Young, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: Impacts and Land Use, A.L.I.-A.B.A. 631 July 31, 1991;
Craig A. Arnold, Conserving Habitats: the Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land
Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1991).
8. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D.Wash. 1988); Northern Spotted
Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D.Wash. 1991); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex.
1988); Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (1979); Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
9. "The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988).
10. 100 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1940).
1I. 857 F.2d 1324(9th Cir. 1988), cert. deniedsub nom. Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114(1989)
(White, J., dissenting).
12. 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985).
13. The "extraordinary case" standard provides a narrow exception for regulated takings of
individuals within a species "in the extraordinary case where population pressures within a given
ecosystem cannot otherwise be relieved .... 16 U-.S.C.§ 1532(3) (1988). This standard applies where
it is necessary to take individual members of a species as a drastic measure to conserve the species as a
whole. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d at 613-15.
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discussed the standard and accepted the adequacy of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service's (FWS) bear population data at face value.
Finally, in Fund for Animals v. Turner,14 a federal district court
issued a preliminary injunction stopping grizzly bear hunting in Montana
until the issue concerning grizzly bear population data was resolved.
Contrary to the court in Christy, the court in Turner examined the
sufficiency of the data on which the FWS and the state of Montana based
the necessity of a grizzly bear hunt. The court determined that the data was
insufficient to support the contentions of the FWS and the state. As a result,
the court issued a preliminary injunction stopping any further grizzly bear
hunting in Montana. The federal government ultimately withdrew the case
from federal district court. The FWS then invoked rulemaking procedures
and removed 50 C.F.R. section 17.40(b)(i)(E), which authorized the
special hunt of grizzly bears in northwestern Montana. 15 The opportunity
afforded hunters to hunt grizzly bears under the ESA no longer exists.
II. BALANCING THE NATION'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING LISTED
PREDATORS WITH PRIVATE INTERESTS UNDER THE ESA
REGULATIONS
A. The Facts and Circumstances Which Precipitated the ESA
Challenge in Christy v. Hodel6
Richard Christy, a sheepman in northwestern Montana, leased
grazing land from the Blackfeet Indian Tribe (Tribe) to run 1,700 head of
sheep beginning on June 1, 1982. The leased grazing land was located
adjacent to Glacier National Park, near prime grizzly habitat. 7 Approxi-
mately one month after turning the sheep into the leased grazing allotment,
grizzly bears began killing sheep on a nightly basis. Christy's shepherd
attempted to ward off the attacks by building fires or firing a rifle into the
air. These prophylactic measures resulted in limited success, and the sheep
slaughter continued.
Shortly after the grizzly bear attacks began, Christy asked for help
from the FWS to stave off the grizzlies. A federal trapper set snares to
catch the offending grizzly bears, but had no success. After ten days,
Christy had lost approximately twenty sheep. On July 9, 1982, while
14. No. 91-2201 1991 WL 206232 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1991) (granting preliminary injunctive
relief to halt grizzly bear hunting in Montana).
15. 57 Fed. Reg. 37,478 (1992).
16. 857 F.2d 1324(9thCir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Christyv. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114(1989)
(White, J., dissenting).




Christy and the federal trapper were on the leased property, two grizzlies
emerged from the forest. The first grizzly retreated back to the forest; the
other continued toward the flock. Christy fired a single shot at the grizzly
when it came within 60-100 yards from the sheep. The bullet struck the
grizzly, which tried to beat a hasty retreat to the forest, but fell wounded a
short distance from where it was shot. Christy fired a second shot to ensure
that the bear was dead.' 8
The grizzly bear raids continued, and finally on July 22, 1982, the
Tribe agreed to cancel the lease. Christy removed the remaining sheep two
days later. Christy had lost a total of 84 sheep to grizzly bear attacks.
Throughout the time the FWS was involved in predator control measures,
the federal trapper apprehended no grizzly bears.' 9
In addition to the financial loss of his sheep, the U.S. Department of
the Interior levied a $3,000 civil fine 20 for killing a grizzly bear2 in
violation of the ESA, which prohibits the taking of a listed species. 2 After
a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge reduced the fine to $2,500.23
Christy filed an administrative appeal of the fine. He argued that the fine
was invalid because it violated his "fundamental constitutional right to
defend his sheep."' 24 The Department denied the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the ESA regulations.2 5
Following the appeal, Christy and two other sheepmen who had also lost
sheep to grizzlies filed this suit in federal district court.
The plaintiffs' claims rested upon the Fifth Amendment and the ESA.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. 6 Thus, to date, the Court has
not recognized a fundamental right arising from the U.S. Constitution to
protect private property from federally protected animals. 7
B. Federal and State Constitutions are at Odds in Many States
In Christy, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals towed the line set out
by the U.S. Supreme Court by refusing to acknowledge the existence of a
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1327. (The ESA provides for civil penalties for taking listed species under 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(a) (1988)).
21. Id. (The ESA enumerates prohibited acts under 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1988)).
22. Id. (The ESA requires the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate and issue protective
regulations to provide for the conservation of threatened or endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)
(1988). The ESA also expressly prohibits the taking of listed species under § 1538(a)(l)).
23. Christy, 857 F.2d at 1326.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
27. Christy', 857 F.2d at 1329 (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423,
1428 n.8 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987)).
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fundamental right to protect property under the Constitution.28 The Ninth
Circuit Court held: "[T]he right to kill federally protected wildlife in
defense of property is not 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'29 nor so
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' 0 that it can be
recognized by us as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment." 1 The Supreme Court declined to review the issues presented in
Christy.32 Thus, no fundamental right to protect property from federally
protected wildlife exists in the federal courts.
Although the federal courts do not recognize a fundamental right to
protect property from harm by wildlife, many state constitutions address
protection of private property as such a fundamental, inviable or inaliena-
ble right.3 Several state courts have upheld citizens' rights to protect their
private property, by use of lethal force, from damage by state regulated
wildlife.34
The common law doctrine of "defense of property" has roots predat-
ing the Constitution, and several commentaries trace the doctrinal
development." In Montana, the court in State v. Rathbone36 examined
whether defense of property was a state-granted constitutional right.37 The
prosecution argued that defense of property was unavailable to the
defendant as an affirmative defense for the offense of killing regulated
game animals. 8 The court, upon examining the Montana Constitution and
28. The Supreme Court's teaching is clear and unmistakable-federal courts should refrain
from divining new fundamental rights from the due process clauses of the [F]ifth and
[F]ourteenth Amendments .... " "In light of the Supreme Court's admonition that we
exercise restraint in creating new definitions of substantive due process, we decline
plaintiffs' invitation to construe the [F]ifth [A]mendment as guaranteeing the right to kill
federally protected wildlife in defense of property.
Id. at 1330.
29. Id. at 1330 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
30. Id. at 1330 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
31. Id.
32. Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989).
33. Lauri Alsup, The Right to Protect Property, 21 ENVTL. L. 209,213 n.26 (1991) (setting out
many state constitutions which enumerate the right to protect property as an inviable or fundamental
right).
34. See generally Cotton v. State, 17 So.2d 590 (Ala. 1944); State v. Ward, 152 N.W. 501 (Iowa
1915); State v. Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86, (Mont. 1940); Cook v. State, 74 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1937); State
v. Cross, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962).
35. See generally Alsup, supra note 33; Sam A. Elbadawi, Grin and Bear it: The Unbearable
Consequences of the Endangered Species Act's Taking Restrictions and the Hunt for a Solution, 41
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1021 (1990); David S. Klain, Does the Endangered Species Act Deprive an Owner
of Fundamental Constitutional Rights: Christy v. Hodel, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 421 (1990).
36. 100 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1940).
37. "All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include.., acquiring,
possessing and protecting property .. . in all lawful ways." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
38. Rathbone, 100 P.2d at 88. (C.R. Rathbone killed an elk out of season and at trial claimed
defense of property as justification for the killing).
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relevant statutes, stated: "If one may kill a human being or attack him in
defense of his property, it would be an unreasonable doctrine to hold that
the right of defense of property as justification for the killing of wild beasts
of the field and the forest does not exist."39 Therefore, the court held that a
citizen could always interpose defense of property as a justification to kill a
wild animal.4 0 However, the act must be "reasonably necessary. '"41
Rathbone narrowed the "reasonably necessary" rule announced in State v.
Ward42 by setting out a three pronged test which the trier of fact must
consider before acquitting a defendant:
[B]efore the defendant can resort to force in protecting his
property from wild animals, (1) he must have exhausted all other
remedies provided by law; (2) the use of such force must be
reasonably necessary and suitable to protect his property; and (3)
he must use only such force and means as a reasonably prudent
man would use under like circumstances.43
Many state courts have applied this test since its adoption in 1940.44 The
rule is still valid for defending property from all game animals that are
under exclusive state regulatory authority. However, states may place
requirements such as obtaining a permit before game may be legally taken
to prevent property destruction.4"
Although state law controls when a citizen may kill a regulated wild
animal in defense of property, federal law preempts less restrictive state
laws in all cases where threatened or endangered animals are listed under
the ESA.4 6 When Congress passed the ESA, certain plants and animals
were selected to be specially protected under federal law. The central
selection criteria for listing species were generally declining numbers of
39. Id. at 91.
40. The court stated that "[Ilegal justification may always be interposed as a defense by a person
charged with killing a wild animal contrary to law." Id.
41. The Rathbone court, in recognizing the right to defend property from damage by wildlife as
a function of the Iowa statute under the Iowa Constitution, stated: "If in this case it was reasonably
necessary for the defendant to kill the deer in question in order to prevent substantial injury to his
property, such fact, we have no doubt, would afford justification for the killing." Id. at 92 (citing State
v. Ward, 152 N.W. 510, 502 (Iowa 1915)).
42. 152 N.W. 501 (Iowa 1915).
43. Rathbone, 100 P.2d at 93. See also Ron A. Bender, The Right to Kill Wild Animals in
Defense of Person or Property, 31 MONT. L. REV. 235 (1970) (more extensive analysis of Rathbone).
44. See, e.g., State v. Webber, 736 P.2d 220,222 (Or. 1987); Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo.
1962).
45. See Webber, 736 P.2d at 221-22 (defendant failed to obtain a permit under Oregon law
before killing six deer that were eating hay from defendant's haystack because he did not want to
comply with the non-wasting measures that the permit required).
46. "Any [s]tate law or regulation respecting the taking of an endangered species or threatened
species may be more restrictive than the exemptions or permits provided for in this Act but not less
restrictive than the prohibitions so defined." 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f)(2) (1988).
1993]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
rare plants and animals or shrinking critical habitat47 which caused a
species to be either endangered4 or threatened. 49 When Congress stepped
into the area of wildlife management through the ESA, federal law
preempted5" state laws that were contrary to Congress' goals of protecting
selected species. Rathbone is still valid law when a person raises defense of
property as justification for killing state regulated wildlife. 51 But the
defense is inapplicable when a person "takes" 52 threatened or endangered
species in violation of the ESA. In Christy, the Ninth Circuit Court made it
clear that the provisions of the ESA preempt less restrictive state law when
ESA listed predators are takera.53
47. The ESA defines critical habitat for an endangered or threatened species as
the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed
in accordance with the provisions of section 1533 of this title, on which are found those
physical or biological features ... essential to the conservation of the species and.., which
may require special management considerations or protection; and (ii) specific areas outside
the geographical area .... "
Id. § 1532(5)(A).
48. The Act defines endangered species as "any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range. ... Id. § 1532(6).
49. The Act defines threatened species as "any species which is likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id.
§ 1532(20).
50. Preemption may occur when Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state
law falling within that field is preempted. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). If Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation, state law is preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law. Id. State
cooperation in furthering the intent of Congress is encouraged under the ESA as long as goals or
objectives are not jeopardized. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1988).
51. A recent controversial example of state regulation in Montana is the practice of shooting
bison that wander from the Yellowstone National Park boundaries onto Montana state lands. The
purpose of the regulation is to protect people and the domestic livestock industry from contracting
disease from the bison. Until recently, hunting permits were issued to accomplish this goal. Now,
permittees rather than park rangers shoot the bison. Since park rangers closely monitor the wandering
bison, the likelihood of a rancher shooting a bison is low. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-215 (1991 )
(the legislature found hunting inappropriate as a management tool, but clearly maintained that the
bison are a threat to people and property in Montana). See also State v. Yarns, 826 P.2d 543 (Mont.
1992) which provides insight into the controversy over killing bison wandering from Yellowstone
National Park.
52. "Take" means "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or
attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532 (1988). "Harm" includes acts that result in
"significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by
significantly impairing essential behavior patterns. ... 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c) (1992).
53. The Ninth Circuit Court held: "[T]he right to kill federally protected wildlife in defense of
property is not 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' nor so 'deeply rooted in this nations history
and tradition' that it can be recognized by us as a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment." Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324,1331 (9th Cir. 1988) cert. deniedsub nom. Christy v.
Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989)(White, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
This statement seems at odds with article II, § 3, of the Montana Constitution which grants citizens
the inalienable right to protect property. However, the right is qualified in the Montana Constitution by
the phrase "in all lawful ways." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. The ESA prohibits the taking of threatened
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III. LIMITED TAKINGS OF THREATENED PREDATORS UNDER ESA
SANCTION: THE MINNESOTA AND MONTANA EXPERIENCE
A. The "Extraordinary Case" Standard as an Exception to the
ESA Prohibition Against Taking a Threatened Species
The court in Rathbone recognized the inevitable difficulties between
state regulated game and private property interests in Montana.5 4 How-
ever, the inevitable problems that the state and private property owners
would experience, as discussed in Rathbone, were not connected to
dwindling habitat or declining species populations. Rather, the problems
were rooted in an over-abundance of wildlife and a yet unrecognized
national desire and need to conserve critical habitat and dwindling
populations of wildlife.5 The court in Rathbone relied on the common law
to settle wildlife property damage disputes between the state and private
interests without the more recent national efforts to conserve habitat and
wildlife. Federal and state laws have increasingly curtailed the common
law rule set out in Rathbone,56 but have not nullified it.
or endangered species absent narrowly defined exceptions. Thus, the Montana Constitution may be
construed as recognizing that taking an ESA listed animal as unlawful and the state granted right to
protect property is not absolute when federal law controls. The ESA "makes no mention... of a right to
kill a member of a threatened species in defense of property." Christ', 857 F.2d at 1329. The ESA
grants exceptions to civil penalties under 16 section 1540(a)(3) and criminal prosecution under section
1 540(b)(3) for killing an endangered or threatened species in self defense or defense of others if the act
was done based on a good faith belief that bodily harm may occur. See also 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.40(b)(l)(i)(B) (1987) (regulation specifically pertaining to the taking of grizzly bears in defense
of person or others).
54.
Montana is one of the few areas in the nation where wild game abounds. It is regarded
as one of the greatest of the state's natural resources .... Wild game existed here long before
the coming of man. One who acquires property in Montana does so with notice and
knowledge of the presence of wild game and presumably is cognizant of its natural habits.
Wild game does not possess the power to distinguish between fructus naturales and fructus
industriales .... Accordingly, a property owner in this state must recognize the fact that
there may be some injury to property or inconvenience from wild game for which there is no
recourse.
State v. Rathbone, 100 P.2d 86, 92-93 (Mont. 1940).
55. "Traditionally, wildlife in America has been regarded as an inexhaustible resource valued
only for its economic utility to whoever succeeded in reducing it to possession." Keith Saxe, Note,
Regulated Taking of Threatened Species Under the Endangered Species Act, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 399
(1988).
The farming and ranching interests nation-wide hunted predators that preyed on livestock or
damaged crops. While game animals as a food, fiber, or source of revenue yielded an "economic
utility," the destruction of predators was an "economic necessity" to the pioneers. James A. Little,
Historical Livestock Grazing Perspective, RANGELANDS, Apr. 1992, at 89 (citing Wolves in Relation
to Stock, Big Game and the National Forest Reserves, FOREST SERVICE BULLETIN No. 72, Jan. 19,
1907, at I (discussing the best methods to destroy wolves causing enormous livestock and game losses
on forest reserves)).
56. See Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962) (plaintiff successfully demonstrated
exhaustion of remedies, reasonable force, and reasonable means to the court, which dismissed the case).
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The ESA precludes any state management practice or law that is not
at least equal to federal law in meeting the objectives of the ESA.57
However, the ESA provides a narrow provision - the "extraordinary
case" standard - that accommodates the taking of a threatened species
under some circumstances.5 8 States have challenged the provision as too
narrow on behalf of private interests within respective states to provide
hunting or trapping opportunities to its citizens.59
The "extraordinary case" standard was initially settled in Sierra Club
v. Clark.0 However, the predecessor cases to Sierra Club v. Clark are
useful to track the development of the application of this standard from the
taking of wolves in Minnesota to the recent halting of grizzly bear hunting
in Montana.
B. Historical Development of Case Law Leading to Sierra Club v.
Clark
Maneuvering by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) to skirt the intent of the ESA began within months of Congress'
passing the ESA in 1973. The Minnesota DNR drafted an administrative
order in May 197461 that essentially permitted taking wolves by trapping
under the Minnesota Directed Predator Control Program. 2 In September
1974, The FWS informed the DNR that the administrative regulation
violated the ESA and ordered the revocation of any authorization to take
wolves in Minnesota.68 The DNR then petitioned the FWS to exclude
Minnesota from the endangered wolves' range.64 The DNR also
threatened to withhold funding and resources from the wolf management
plan unless the FWS authorized a sport season for managing the timber
But see State v. Webber, 736 P.2d 220, 221 (Or. 1981) (defendant failed to obtain a permit prior to
killing deer and the state convicted Webber of killing and wasting game).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (1988).
58. Id.§ 1532(3). The definition of conservation embraces the notion of a regulated taking of an
endangered or threatened species under "extraordinary cases" where population pressures cannot be
relieved by any other means. Section 1539 further allows for permits and exemptions to ESA provisions
under other narrow circumstances.
59. Minnesota resisted federal control of the timber wolf because it effectively halted the
opportunity for citizens to trap or hunt within the state. Similarly, Montana issued permits on a limited
basis to citizens that enabled them to take grizzly bears lawfully in a designated region. See 48 Fed.
Reg. 36,256 (1983) (regulations concerning wolf hunting); 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(b)(l)(i)(e) (1981)
(regulations concerning grizzly bear hunting).
60. 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985).
61. Keith J. Halleland, Sierra Club v. Clark: The Government Cries Wolf, 11 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 969, 973 (1985).
62. Brian B. O'Neill, The Law of Wolves, 18 ENVTL. L. 227, 228 (1988).
63. Halleland, supra note 61, at 973 n.32.
64. Id. at 973 (citing Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F.Supp. 783, 785 (D. Minn. 1984).
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wolves. 65 The FWS took no administrative action, pending a review by the
Eastern Timber Wolf Recovery Team (ETWRT).66 During this period,
the FWS took over the wolf Depredation Control Program from Minnesota
in early 1975.67 In 1977, a Minnesota farmer filed the first case concerning
livestock depredation by timber wolves.6
In Brzoznowski v. Andrus, plaintiff sought money damages for
livestock losses and an injunction requiring the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) to remove all timber wolves from plaintiff's land.69 The
Minnesota legislature responded to the litigation by passing a statute to
compensate for livestock losses due to wolf predation."0 In February 1978,
the ETWRT recommended that the Secretary remove the eastern timber
wolf from the endangered species list and reclassify the wolf as a
threatened species.7 1 The ETWRT also recommended that the Secretary
permit a sport season to enhance the image of the timber wolf in the eyes of
the public. 72 The recommendation also included returning management of
the wolf population to Minnesota.7" The FWS refused to adopt the sport
season recommendation and likewise refused to turn over the management
of the wolves to Minnesota. 74 However, the wolves were reclassified as
threatened,75 which allowed federal trappers to take wolves in response to
reported livestock depredation.7 6 In May 1978, federal trappers began
65. Id. at 976 (citing SECTION OF WILDLIFE, MINN. DEP'T OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
MINNESOTA TIMBER WOLF MANAGEMENT PLAN 3, at 15 (1980)).
66. The ESA mandates the formation of recovery teams to develop recovery plans for
endangered and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (1988).
67. Halleland, supra note 61 at 974.
68. Brzoznowski v. Andrus, No. 5-77-19 (D. Minn. June 9, 1978).
69. O'Neill,supra note 62, at 229 (citing Brzoznowski v. Andrus, No. 5-77-19 (D. Minn. June 9,
1978)).
70. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 97.488 (repealed 1986).
71. O'Neill, supra note 62, at 230 (citing U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, Wolf Depredation on Livestock in Minnesota 3, RESOURCE PUBLICATION No. 145,
at 4 (1982)).
72. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 790 (D. Minn 1984).
73. Halleland, supra note 61, at 976 (citing Proposed Regulations Governing the Grey Wolf in
Minnesota, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528 (1982). These regulations were drafted after the FWS had rejected
prior proposals from the DNR to turn over management of the wolf to Minnesota. The proposed
regulations reversed the previous position of the FWS on wolf management in Minnesota. Id. at 977
(citing letter from Harvey K. Nelson, Regional Director of the FWS, to Joseph N. Alexander, DNR
Comm. (Aug. 6, 1980)) (refusal of FWS to turn over control of the wolf management in Minnesota to
the DNR).
74. Halleland, supra note 61, at 977 (citing letter from Harvey K. Nelson, Regional Director of
the FWS, to Joseph N. Alexander, DNR Comm'r (Aug. 6, 1980)).
75. The eastern timber wolf is classified as endangered in the lower 48 states outside of
Minnesota. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1986).
76. Saxe, supra note 55, at 414 (quoting43 Fed. Reg. 9,607,9,615 (1978)) (codified as amended
at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (1986)).
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indiscriminately trapping wolves "in advance of depredation,"" resulting
in more wolves being taken than were actually causing livestock losses.78
The authorization for indiscriminate trapping did not go unchallenged. As
the Brzoznowski litigation continued, a coalition of environmental groups
moved the court to intervene in the case in late May 1978.79 The court
denied the motion.80 The coalition filed an independent lawsuit to chal-
lenge the trapping procedures.
In Fundfor Animals v. Andrus,8 plaintiffs argued that any rationally
based control effort would take as few wolves as possible and that the FWS
regulations permitted the taking of offending animals only.82 The court,
relying on expert testimony, held:
1). Control measures are strictly limited to cases where wolf
depredation losses were significant,
2). Control measures restricted federal trappers to known
wolf offenders,
3). Federal trappers could not trap beyond one-quarter mile
from the kill site, and
4). Trappers could not take wolf pups.83
The FWS granted permission for the taking of wolves in cases of confirmed
livestock depredation, for research purposes, or for humane reasons.8 '
Fund for Animals spelled out the working rules for wolf predation control.
Although Fund for Animals set out strict wolf control guidelines, the
status quo was short lived. At the request of Secretary James Watt, the
DNR drafted a proposed state management plan in 1982.5 The plan
included a sport season on wolves, legalized sales of wolf pelts, and a target
level for harvesting wolves that met DNR management goals for state deer
populations.8 6 The FWS adopted the Minnesota Wolf Management Plan
and modified the guidelines set out by the court in Fund for Animals.8 7
77. Proposed Regulations Governing the Grey Wolf in Minnesota, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528, 30,530
(1982) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (1982)).
78. O'Neill, supra note 62, at 231.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Fund for Animals v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (D. Minn. 1978).
82. O'Neill, supra note 62, at 231 (interpreting II Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA), at 2200-01).
83. Id. (interpreting 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA), at 2200-03).
84. Id. (referring to Final Regulations Governing Reclassification of the Grey Wolf in the
United States and Mexico, with Determination of Critical Habitat in Michigan and Minnesota, 43
Fed. Reg. 9,706 (1978).
85. Id. at 232 (citing Proposed Regulations Governing the Grey Wolf in Minnesota, 47 Fed.
Reg. 30,528, 30,531 (1982)).
86. Id. (citing Proposed Regulations Governing the Grey Wolf in Minnesota, 47 Fed. Reg.
30,528, 30,531 (1982) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 17 (1982)).
87. Id. at 233.
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The modifications the FWS adopted included: (1) expanding the
trapping zone from a one-quarter mile radius to a one-half mile radius of
livestock kill sites, (2) reinstating of non-selective trapping, and (3)
dropping the requirement that wolves must be taken in a humane
manner.8 The DNR and FWS could not implement the modifications
without petitioning the court to reopen Fund for Animals. 9 The Sierra
Club, Defenders of Wildlife, and other environmental organizations
immediately challenged the petition with new litigation in federal district
court.90 Fund for Animals became Sierra Club v. Clark.
C. Sierra Club v. Clark: The Christening of the "Extraordinary
Case" Standard
1. The Decision
In Sierra Club v. Clark, plaintiffs sought to prevent the DNR and the
FWS from implementing the FWS' proposed regulations. 1 These regula-
tions, if allowed to take effect in Minnesota, authorized the DNR to
manage the timber wolves through a sport hunting and trapping season.
The proposed regulations also modified the existing livestock predation
control program that the FWS managed at that time. These changes
allowed wolves to be indiscriminately trapped without the use of humane
trapping methods, contrary to regulations set out in Fund for Animals v.
Andrus.
The court in Fund for Animals v. Andrus92 set out regulations that
prohibited the trapping of wolves unless significant depredation of live-
stock occurred and the FWS could identify and trap the specific wolves
causing livestock depredation.93 The court later amended the order by
restricting trapping of wolves to within one quarter mile of livestock kill
sites. 4 Following Fund for Animals, the DNR requested that the FWS
transfer management of the wolf to Minnesota 95 and that the FWS
authorize a sport hunting season as part of the management plan.96 The
FWS rejected the request because the ESA prohibited the taking of timber
88. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 786 (D. Minn. 1984) (citing 50 C.F.R.
§ 14.40(d)(2) (1982)).
89. Id. at 787.
90. Id. at 783.
91. Id.
92. 11 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (D. Minn. 1978).
93. O'Neill, supra note 62, at 231 (citing Fund for Animals v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA), at 2200-01).
94. Id. (citing 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA), at 2203).
95. Proposed Regulations Governing the Grey Wolf in Minnesota, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,528 (1982).
96. Id.
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wolves97 and the proposal would violate Fund for Animals. 8 Under the
Reagan Administration, the FWS reversed its position.9 The FWS issued
the final proposed wolf regulations on August 10, 1983,100 which spawned
the Sierra Club litigation in federal court.
The central issue in Sierra Club v. Clark was whether the Secretary
had the authority, under the ESA statutes, to promulgate regulations
permitting a sport hunting season for timber wolves.101 A secondary issue
addressed was whether the FWS could modify the livestock depredation
program regulations without cause or explanation.102 Both parties agreed
the case presented only a question of law, making summary judgment
appropriate. Because both sides relied on separate interpretations of
several provisions within the ESA, the court turned to the ESA itself to
settle the matter. The district court interpreted the plain language of the
ESA and held that "[b]efore a threatened species may be taken [via sport
hunting], a determination must be made that population pressures within
the animals' ecosystem cannot otherwise be relieved." 103 The court further
stated: "The government does not even attempt to argue that such an
extraordinary case exists. Rather, the novel argument is asserted that the
declaration of a sport season is within the Secretary's discretion"10 4 and "a
sport season would enhance the value of the wolf in the eyes of the
public."10 5 The court rejected the government's arguments and held that
"conservation" as defined under the ESA prohibited a sport season unless
the government could meet the "extraordinary case" standard within 16
U.S.C. section 1532(3) of the ESA. 06 The court further declared that the
modifications the FWS instituted after Fund for Animals would not
decrease the number of wolves taken, but would increase them. 0 7 In
97. Halleland, supra note 61, at 977 (citing letter from Harvey K. Nelson, Regional Director of
the FWS, to Joseph N. Alexander, DNR Comm'r (Aug. 6, 1980)).
98. Id. (citing letter from Elmer T. Nitzschke, Field Solicitor, U.S. Department of the Interior,
to Harvey Nelson, Regional Director of the FWS, at I (Mar. 7, 1980); letter from Lynn A. Greenwalt,
Director of the FWS to the Regional Director, at 4 (June 27, 1980); Fund for Animals v. Andrus, II
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (D. Minn. 1978)).
99. The reasons for the change in position might have been from political pressure within
Minnesota. The public in Minnesota apparently harbored a great deal of antagonism toward the wolf as
250 wolves were illegally killed each year in the early 1980's. Halleland, supra note 61, at 977 (citing
Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 577, 790 (D. Minn. 1984) and the deposition of David Mech, at 9
(Oct. 25, 1983) (between 25-30% of the total wolf population in Minnesota is illegally killed each
year)).
100. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256 (1983).
101. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 787-89 (D. Minn. 1984).
102. Id. at 790.
103. Id. at 787.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 790.




addition, the FWS illegally changed the depredation regulations without
explanation."0 8 The government then appealed the decision to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 109
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling which re-
stricted the discretion of the Secretary in allowing the taking of wolves
absent the requirement of the "extraordinary case" standard."10 The court
reversed and remanded on the issue of whether the FWS's predation
control program modifications were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
authority."' The parties then settled the case." 2 The only significant
concession the FWS gained was the one-half mile radius extension from
wolf depredation locations."13 The other modifications were not adopted.
2. Examining The Court's Reasoning
The major issue in Sierra Club was whether the Secretary had the
authority under the ESA to allow a sport hunting season on timber wolves.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the federal district court's holding that a sport
season was not within the discretion of the Secretary unless extraordinary
circumstances existed."14 The district and Eighth Circuit courts derived
their holdings from the plain language and a review of the legislative
history of the ESA. Although the courts looked for legislative intent in the
history of the ESA, the plain language of the ESA was determinative." 5
The government argued that the ESA empowered the Secretary to
exercise absolute discretion over promulgating regulations to conserve a
threatened species." 6 Specifically, the government relied on the permissive
term "may" to construe the language to mean "may or may not," thus
creating an option as to whether the Secretary could authorize the taking of
a threatened species. 1 Thus, the government relied upon the amplifica-
tion of an ambiguity within individual statutes as the central strategy of its
108. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 790 (D. Minn. 1984).
109. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783 (D. Minn. 1984).
110. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 1985).
111. Id. at 619. See Sierra Club v. Clark, 607 F. Supp. 737, 738 (D. Minn. 1985) (on remand,
parties discussed the issues and settled their differences).
112. O'Neill, supra note 62, at 236.
113. Sierra Club v. Clark, 607 F. Supp. 737, 738 (D. Minn. 1985).
114. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 618 (8th Cir. 1985).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 614. Section 1533(d) states:
Whenever any species is listed as a threatened species ... the Secretary shall issue such
regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such
species. The secretary may by regulation prohibit with respect to any threatened species any
act prohibited under section 1538(a)(1) of this title, in the case of fish or wildlife ....
16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
117. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 788 (D. Minn. 1984).
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case. The government avoided any argument concerning the current wolf
populations in Minnesota."' The government actually conceded that wolf
populations had been stable since 1975 - a stable population would not
indicate an "extraordinary case" that would require the taking of wolves
through a sport hunting season. "'
In response to the government's argument regarding the language of
section 1533(d), the district court flatly stated that the argument ignored
the intent of Congress. 20 Further, the court stated: "The only reasonable
construction this court can place on the statutes in question is that only in
the case of a threatened species can the Secretary ever order that a taking
occur," and never could such an order involve an endangered species.' 2 '
The Eighth Circuit was next faced with the task of interpreting the
term "conservation."' 22 The Secretary relied upon the general definition of
"conservation" in section 1532(3) to argue that endangered species may be
taken when population pressures exceed the capacity of their ecosystems,
while threatened species are subject to the regulatory measures that
address the problems contributing to the species' decline. 2 The argument
focussed on the "or" connector to construe the term to mean that
endangered species may be taken when populations exceed the carrying
capacity of the ecosystem. The central point of this argument is that the
definition of conservation allows the taking of endangered species and
enjoys priority over the prohibition of taking endangered species under
section 1538(a)(1).12 4 The Secretary argued that the definition of conser-
vation provides for discretion in whether or not a threatened species could
be taken to alleviate the problems that contribute to the wolf's decline. The
purpose of this argument was to justify a sport season to enhance the
wolves' public image and elicit public support for conservation of the
species.12 5
118. Id. at 789.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 788.
121. Id.
122. The ESA definition of "conservation" states:
'[C]onserve,' 'conserving,' and 'conservation' mean to use and the use of all methods and
procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered or threatened species to the point at
which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. Such
methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all activities associated with
scientific resource management such as research .... live trapping, and transplantation, and,
in the extraordinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot be
otherwise relieved, may include regulated taking.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982).
123. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608, 614-15 (8th Cir. 1985).
124. Id.
125. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 790 (D. Minn. 1984). The idea behind the sport
hunting and trapping was to encourage support for conservation of the wolf in order to provide a
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The Eighth Circuit also rejected the government's interpretation of
"conservation" because it ignored the interrelations of the provisions of the
ESA.126 The court determined that section 1532(3)127 generally limited
the discretion of the Secretary and section 1538(a)(1) 128 specifically
limited the Secretary with regard to endangered species. 129 The court
noted that the general definition of conservation in section 1532(3) does not
override section 1538(a)(1)(b), which prohibits the taking of endangered
species. 130 The Eighth Circuit stated: "To fail to use Congress' definition of
[conservation] would refuse to give effect to a crucial part of the enacted
statutory law."' 13 The court firmly established that all the provisions of the
act must be read together, and the definitions set out by Congress applied to
the provisions of the ESA. i3 2 The court concluded that the statutory
language of the provisions at issue concerning the ESA were clear and the
statutes limited the Secretary's discretion to allow a public sport season for
timber wolves.' 3
D. Christy v. Hodel: Sport Hunting of Grizzly Bears Under the
ESA "Extraordinary Case" Standard
Christy examined the "extraordinary case" standard in the context of
whether sport hunting of grizzly bears had a rational basis in light of ESA
mandates to conserve rather than take endangered or threatened spe-
cies. 3 Specifically, the court analyzed the sport hunting issue by applying
an equal protection construction of the Fifth Amendment due process
clause to the issues raised by the plaintiffs.3 5
Plaintiffs argued that the ESA prohibitions against taking grizzly
bears and penalties for taking grizzly bears in defense of property created
two classifications of citizens. Plaintiffs argued these two classes of citizens
violated the equal protection clause under the U.S. Constitution. The first
classification allegedly created was between livestock producers near
renewable opportunity each year for the citizens of Minnesota to hunt and trap. A secondary effect of
hunting eliminates wolves that no longer fear humans. 48 Fed. Reg. 36,256 (1983). The FWS
considered hunting a primary tool to instill fear in grizzly bears to reduce bear-human conflicts. 51 Fed.
Reg. 33,753 (1986).
126. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d at 614-15.
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1982).
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1982).
129. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d at 614.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 613.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 615.
134. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub. nom. Christy v.
Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). (White, J., dissenting).
135. Id.(citing Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974)).
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grizzly bear habitat and the rest of the U.S. citizens and taxpayers. The
court quickly dismissed this argument for lack of any evidence or a showing
that the ESA creates a classification as plaintiffs alleged.' 3 6
The second classification allegedly created by the ESA allowed a
select group of sport hunters to kill grizzlies legally under certain
circumstances while penalizing livestock producers who could not legally
kill grizzlies to protect their property from immediate harm.13 7 Plaintiffs
argued that killing grizzly bears for sport hunting purposes could not be
related to the goals of the Act and was a derogation of the purposes of the
ESA. Thus, plaintiffs argued as a matter of law there could be no rational
basis for hunting grizzly bears.' The court turned to section 1532(3) and
found that Congress had provided for the limited taking of a threatened
species in the "extraordinary case" where population pressures within a
given ecosystem could not otherwise be reduced.' 9 The court concluded
that Congress authorized the Secretary to allow the taking of grizzly bears
through sport hunting in "extraordinary cases."' a4 Further, the court
stated that the Secretary had a rational basis in allowing grizzly bear
hunting as a conservation tool.' 4 '
The Secretary relied on studies and data suggesting that a controlled
sport hunt would lead to the taking of bears that were less than wary of
humans, thus decreasing grizzly bear-human contact and promoting bear
conservation. 42 It is important to note that the court did not review the
adequacy of the data on which the Secretary relied to regulate sport
hunting. Christy only addressed the issue of whether the Secretary had a
rational basis to allow sport hunting of grizzly bears in Montana. The
issues of whether data concerning grizzly bear population was adequate
and whether subsequent regulations supporting a grizzly bear hunt were
arbitrary or capricious were recently addressed in Fund for Animals v.
Turner.14
8
136. Id. at 1332. The court found that as a matter of logic, livestock producers are more subject
to regulation than urban citizens. The court analogized to the difference between motorists and
bicyclists - both are obligated to obey the speed limit but motorists are much more likely to be in peril
of violation more frequently. There is no equal protection violation when no suspect class exists and the
regulation is applied evenly to all citizens even though a small identifiable group finds the regulation
more frequently applied to their group. Id. at 1332 n.6.
137. Plaintiffs cited 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(b)(1)(i)(E) (1981) as creating the classification on its
face. Plaintiffs did not contend that the classification created was suspect, thus the "rational basis" test
applied and the court would uphold the regulation if any rational basis supported the regulation.
Christy, 857 F.2d at 1332.
138. Id. at 1332-33.
139. Id. at 1333.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Revision of Special Regulations for the Grizzly Bear, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,755-57 (1986).
143. No. 91-2201, 1991 WL 206232 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 1991).
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E. Fund For Animals v. Turner: Putting a Halt to the Grizzly
Bear Hunting in Montana Unless the "Extraordinary Case"
Standard is Based On Reasonable Data
The case law concerning the "extraordinary case" standard has
revolved around issues concerning private interests and predatory
threatened species such as the grizzly bear and timber wolf. In Sierra Club
v. Clark, the state of Minnesota and ultimately the FWS under the Reagan
Administration argued that sport hunting of wolves would "enhance
wolves in the eyes of the public." 144 The basis for a hunting and trapping
program was that it was a desirable and advisable conservation tool. No
argument was even attempted that an "extraordinary case" existed where
too many wolves were present for available habitat. In Christy v. Hodel,
plaintiffs argued that the Secretary of the Interior had no rational basis for
allowing sport hunting of grizzly bears and that allowing such a hunt
directly conflicted with ESA goals and mandates. The court deferred to the
data the Secretary presented indicating that there was an "extraordinary
case" where too many bears existed in particular areas and a sport hunt was
rationally based upon eradicating bears that had lost their fear of humans.
The Ninth Circuit Court did not question the adequacy of the data. In
contrast, in Fund For Animals v. Turner, the court reviewed the adequacy
of the "extraordinary case" data to determine whether the sport hunting
regulations were arbitrary and capricious or rationally related to conserva-
tion goals of the ESA. In Turner, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction
to stop the grizzly bear hunting in Montana. The court granted the
injunction pending a final determination of the case.
To issue a preliminary injunction, the court must evaluate four
factors: (1) plaintiffs' likelihood of success, (2) the potential for irreparable
injury in the absence of an injunction, (3) the balance of hardships among
the parties, and (4) the public interest.145 The likelihood of success was the
key factor in Turner and is the only factor discussed.
The FWS issued regulations which allowed grizzly bear hunting
under certain circumstances in accordance with Montana Law in 1975.146
The FWS found that the Bob Marshall Wilderness Ecosystem (BME)
grizzly bear population was excessive for the ecosystem 47 and met the
144. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. 783, 790 (D. Minn. 1984).
145. Turner, 1991 WL206232,at*l (citing Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 834-35 (D.C.Cir. 1984)).
146. See 40 Fed. Reg. 31,735 (1975).
147. "[The] grizzly bear population [in the BME] is large enough that bears are now wandering
into settled areas where they threaten human safety and commit significant depredations on legally
present livestock. Thus, grizzly bear pressures definitely exist in the [BME]." Turner, 1991 WL
206232, at *2 (citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31,735 (1975)).
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"extraordinary case" test set out in the ESA. In 1985, the FWS revised the
regulations on an emergency basis and reduced the total number of
allowable grizzly bear deaths from 25 to 15.148 The revised regulations also
redefined the boundaries of the hunting zone and renamed the ecosystem
the Northern Continental Divide Ecosystem (NCDE).'49 In 1986, the
FWS permanently revised the regulations and allowed only 14 grizzly
bears or six females to be taken by any means. 5 °
The central issue in Turner was whether the FWS determination that
the NCDE represents an "extraordinary case" of grizzly bear "population
pressures" was arbitrary and capricious.1 51 The court reviewed the merits
of the case with a strong presumption in favor of upholding the validity of
the regulation. 52 The court determined that plaintiffs successfully showed
a degree of likelihood of success on the merits of their claim.1 58
The court found it significant that the Secretary and the state of
Montana as intervenors could not produce any direct evidence of actual
numbers of grizzly bears in relation to the carrying capacity of the
ecosystem.1 54 Rather, the defendants argued the hunt was rationally based
upon evidence in the administrative record of more bear-human contact
and increased incidents of property damage and livestock depredation.1 55
To meet their burden of proof, the defendants offered two theories of why
the bear hunt was rationally based upon the data in the administrative
record.
First, the "defendants argued that the movement of bears outside of
their natural range is a 'secondary effect' of population pressures" and an
indication that too many bears were residing within the ecosystem. 56 The
court took notice of FWS statements that there may be a multitude of
reasons why bears may move out of natural areas to more settled areas . 57
148. Id. at *2 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 35,087 (1985). This reduction was applicable only to the 1985
hunting season.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *3 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 33,753 (1986)). The FWS has not modified the revised
regulations, thus 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(b)(1 )(i)(E) (1986) is the regulation which plaintiffs challenged in
this case. Ultimately, the FWS removed 50 C.F.R. § 1 7.40(b)(l)(i)(E) and precluded any possibility of
hunting grizzly bears. 57 Fed. Reg. 37,478 (1992).
151. Turner, 1991 WL 206232, at *3,4.
152. Id. at *4.
153. Id.
154. "Specifically lacking are better data on habitat condition or carrying capacity, total
numbers, annual reproduction, and most importantly, annual turnover and population trends." Id.
(citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31,734 (1975)).
155. Turner, 1991 WL 206232, at *4.
156. Id.
157. Id. This movement may be attributable to one or a combination of factors, such as
availability of foods along riparian zones, artificial food sources (livestock carcass dumps, beehives,
etc.), climatic changes, loss of previously utilized habitat, or an actual increase in the size of the overall
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The court rejected defendants' argument because they failed to present
any evidence that the bears moved out of their ecosystem due to population
pressures as opposed to any other factor.
158
Second, the defendants argued that "population pressure" should be
broadly defined to include not only bears per unit area but also other
pressures which create conflict between bears and humans living in the
same area. 159 The court turned to the legislative intent behind the ESA and
determined that Congress intended a narrow construction of what "popu-
lation pressure" meant.160 The court concluded that FWS' and Montana's
argument was not likely a rational basis for the FWS and Montana to
conclude that bear population pressures had exceeded their ecosystem in
the sense Congress intended by as of 1986.161
Since 1975, the FWS has repeatedly stated in its policy statements
that grizzly bear hunting is a desirable conservation tool.' 62 The FWS
maintained that hunting instills in bears a wariness of humans and
effectively restricts the bears to their native range, consequently reducing
bear-human contact.' 6 3 The defendants argued that this rationale for
hunting grizzly bears is a sound tool for conserving the grizzly bear. 64
However, the court rejected this argument. The court concluded that the
plain language of the ESA does not authorize the taking of a threatened
species even though the taking might be a desirable conservation tool.' 65
Rather, threatened species may be taken only when an "extraordinary
case" exists and the species expands beyond the carrying capacity of its
bear population and consequent dispersal. 51 Fed. Reg. 33,755 (1986).
158. Turner, 191 WL 206232, at *3, 4.
159. Id. at *5.
160. Id. The court reviewed language found within the congressional record and concluded:
"[t] his language indicates that congress was referring to "population pressures" in a limited ecological
sense-where the animal "exceeds the carrying capacity of its particular ecosystem"--rather than in a
looser sense of any pressures creating conflict between bears and persons in surrounding communities."
Id.
161. Id. The court examined the administrative record on its own to determine whether any
evidence existed to support a finding that population pressures existed. After reviewing the record, the
court stated that more evidence existed to corroborate the conclusion that no pressures existed in 1986.
Id.
162. Id. at *6.
The [FWS] continues to hold that regulated hunting is necessary and advisable for the
conservation of the of the grizzly in northwestern Montana .... Such hunting would tend to
eliminate those bears that are unwary of humans and thus most likely to come into conflict
with people. The remaining bears would likely be wary of humans and less likely to become
involved in depredations or bear-human conflicts that would lead to control actions and
possible [grizzly] mortality.
51 Fed. Reg. 33,753 (1986).
163. Turner, 1991 WL 20632, at *6.
164. Id. at *3,4.
165. Id.
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ecosystem.116
The defendants' final argument was that the court should review the
treatment of the authorization for the grizzly bear hunt in Christy v. Hodel
where a federal judge had concluded there was a rational basis for the
hunt.167 The court in Turner distinguished the Christy case. The court
reasoned that in Christy plaintiffs had confronted the court with a
constitutional attack claiming there was no rational basis for hunting
grizzlies and that the hunt was inconsistent with ESA goals and objec-
tives. 6 " The plaintiffs had not challenged the adequacy of the data upon
which the grizzly bear hunt rested. 6 9 In contrast, the court in Turner had
to determine whether there was a rational basis for the hunt based upon the
adequacy of the data. Therefore, the court concluded that Christy did not
apply to this issue.'70
F. The Final Result of Turner: Grizzly Bear Sport Hunting is No
Longer Possible Under Any Circumstance
The federal government dropped its suit in federal district court as a
result of Turner. Because the regulation permitting a sport hunt was not
valid under the injunction, the FWS extinguished the regulation.' 7 ' As a
result, the issue of whether or not grizzly bears should be hunted is moot.
The removal of the regulation absolutely bars any possibility of the sport
hunting of grizzly bears. Until scientific data exists that clearly indicates
that the grizzly bear population has expanded beyond the carrying
capacity of the ecosystem, the bears are safe from hunters.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sierra Club limits the discretion of the Secretary in authorizing the
taking of a threatened species to research purposes, depredation control, or
in extraordinary cases where populations exceed the carrying capacity of
the ecosystem. This is a reasonable construction of the ESA, and follows
the intent of Congress when it passed the ESA in 1973.172 The court in
166. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F.Supp. 783, 790 (D. Minn. 1984); Sierra Club v.
Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985)).
167. Id. at *7.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Turner, 1991 WL 206232, at *7.
171. 57 Fed. Reg. 37,478 (1992). (EffectiveAug. 19, 1992). "The [FWS] removes 50 [C.F.R.]
17.40(b)(i)(E), the special rule that allows [the taking] of grizzly bears through a special hunt in
northwestern Montana in order to respond to a memorandum opinion of the U.S. District Court." Id.
172. See Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom.
Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). (White, J., dissenting). The court held that the Secretary of
the Interior had the authority to promulgate regulations authorizing a limited sport hunt on grizzly
bears in designated geographic areas in Montana. The authorization was based on a determination by
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Sierra Club effectively set out the circumstances in which a threatened
species may be taken, and required that proof must be shown that an
extraordinary case exists which justifies the taking of a threatened species.
The court in Turner expanded Sierra Club by reviewing the adequacy of
the data required to show that an "extraordinary case" existed. Both the
courts in Sierra Club and Turner firmly established that the ESA is clear
on its face and further attempts to skirt the intent of Congress will fail.
Further, the importance of Sierra Club, Christy, and Turner is
apparent as the issue of wolf reintroduction heats up in Montana and other
states.173 If reintroduction efforts succeed, authority exists to guide courts
in determining under what circumstances a threatened species may be
taken. Although there has been a lull in litigation concerning wolves in
Minnesota since Sierra Club, controversy is on the horizon. In 1990,
Minnesota livestock producers reported record losses due to depredation
by wolves.17 4 In addition, the annual fund that compensates livestock
producers for proven depredation losses to wolves was depleted within four
months.1 75 The wolf population swelled to an estimated 1,750 animals in
1990.176 As wolf numbers increase, contact between wolves and the public
will surely increase, resulting in friction between livestock producer and
hunting interests and the public interests protected under the ESA. Sport
hunting of wolves will again be the most likely issue to arise in Minnesota if
the population continues to increase and the wolves' range expands.
Specifically, the courts may be faced with the issue of whether the wolf
population has exceeded the carrying capacity of the ecosystem and sport
hunting is the only means remaining to reduce the population. Ultimately,
a compromise between private and public interests which compensates
livestock producers equitably for losses and in return fosters producer
cooperation may be the answer. Predation problems will not disappear, but
the FWS that population pressures within the grizzly bear ecosystem could not be reduced by any other
means than a sport hunt. A determination of this kind was not made in Sierra Club v. Clark. Thus,
creating a sport season was not within the discretion of the Secretary.
173. Wolf packs from Glacier National park are migrating south along logging trails to western
Montana. Approximately 40 to 50 wolves exist in this region of Montana, and another 10 to 20 exist in
central Idaho. The re-introduction of wolves is a hotly contested issue and will grow more fierce in the
future. Sharon Begley et al., Return of the Wolf, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 1991, at 44. The goal of the
wolf recovery team in Montana is to reach ten breeding pairs of wolves. In February 1993, an employee
of the Sun River Wildlife Management Area spotted a fifth breeding pair. The wolf could be taken off
the endangered list when ten confirmed pairs are known to exist in Montana. State has Fifth Wolf
Pack, MISSOULIAN, Mar. 3, 1993, at B-1.
174. Michael Booth, Predator's Success Endangers Wildlife Truce; Resurgence of Gray Wolf
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will likely increase with increasing numbers of wolves and grizzly bears.1 7
In any event, cooperation from all parties concerned is necessary to
increase threatened predator populations efficiently. Viable populations of
threatened species such as the eastern timber wolf in Minnesota and the
grizzly bear in Montana depend on a negotiated solution.
Until the wolves in Minnesota and the grizzly bears in Montana
recover to a point where they no longer need protection or multiply beyond
the carrying capacity of their ecosystem, there will be no sport hunting
season on these predators. Further, the case law firmly establishes that the
FWS and the state administering a sport hunting season for ESA listed
predators must show a rational basis for the hunt based upon data which
supports an "extraordinary case" where the species has populated beyond
the carrying capacity of the ecosystem.
177. A Montana state game warden killed a grizzly bear near Lincoln, Montana after the bear
killed 35 sheep over a five day period. Wildlife officials relocated the grizzly bear twice in the last two
years after the bear caused problems with sheep and pigs. The game warden shot the bear as a last resort
after Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks personnel attempted, but failed, to trap the bear. Game
Warden Kills Marauding Grizzly, MISSOULIAN, July 14, 1993, at A-1.
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